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In this paper we investigate the volatility structure of the German stock market
index DAX and its constituents. Using a recently developed test, we ¯nd a volatility
break in 1997. Interestingly, not only is the volatility higher after 1997 but the
volatility persistence also increased. That means that there is a greater likelihood
of high volatility days being followed by further high volatility days. An immediate
consequence is that the tails of the distribution of stock market returns become fatter
orthattheprobabilityofextremepricemovementsbecomesgreater.Thebreakin
volatility is not only a phenomenon of the index itself; the returns of the underlying
equities also show a volatility break. If the volatility is decomposed into market
and ¯rm-speci¯c or idiosyncratic components, the idiosyncratic volatility is shown
to have increased much more than the market volatility. This is probably connected
to the declining correlations among individual stock returns and has implications
for portfolio diversi¯cation.
When analysing potential reasons for the break in volatility, we ¯nd that the
increase in the volatility of the German stock market cannot be attributed to inter-
national spillovers alone. Domestic factors which may help to explain the break in
volatility are the growing number of institutional investors and the increase in the
volatility of longer-term interest rates.
Keywords: market and idiosyncratic volatility, test on break in volatility dy-
namics, institutional ownership
JEL Classi¯cation: C32Zusammenfassung
Dieses Arbeitspapier analysiert VerÄ anderungen der VolatilitÄ at des Deutschen Aktien-
index (DAX) und der in ihm enthaltenen Aktienwerte. Ein kÄ urzlich entwickelter
Test zeigt einen Bruch im Ausma¼ der Schwankungen der Aktienrenditen im Jahr
1997 an. Seitdem nahm nicht nur die VolatilitÄ at der tÄ aglichen Aktienrenditen deut-
lich zu, sondern es stieg auch deren Persistenz an. Das heisst, auf Tage mit hohen
Schwankungen folgen jetzt viel hÄ au¯ger Tage mit ebenfalls hoher VolatilitÄ at. Die
ebenso hÄ ohere Wahrscheinlichkeit extremer Preisschwankungen zeigt sich darin, dass
die Verteilung der AktienkursertrÄ age deutlich mehr Masse in den RÄ andern aufweist.
Interessanterweise lÄ asst sich der Bruch in der VolatilitÄ at nicht nur im Index, son-
dern auch bei fast allen Einzelwerten etwa zum selben Zeitpunkt nachweisen. Eine
Zerlegung der VolatilitÄ at in eine Marktkomponente und eine ¯rmenspezi¯sche oder
idiosynkratische Komponente zeigt desweiteren, dass letztere viel stÄ arker angestiegen
ist als das systematische oder Marktrisiko. Im Zusammenhang damit stehen die
gesunkenen Korrelationen zwischen den Einzelaktien; diese haben Auswirkungen
auf die Risikodiversi¯kation eines Portfolios.
Als mÄ ogliche Ursachen fÄ ur den Anstieg der VolatilitÄ at kÄ onnen nicht allein Ä Uber-
tragungen von Schwankungen anderer internationaler MÄ arkte, insbesondere des ame-
rikanischen Marktes, gelten. Heimische Faktoren, die helfen kÄ onnen den Bruch in
der Dynamik der Schwankungen der AktienertrÄ age zu erklÄ aren, sind die zunehmende
Rolle institutioneller Investoren am Aktienmarkt und die steigende VolatilitÄ at von
Langfristzinsen.Contents
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The changing structure of German
stock market volatility¤
1 Introduction
It has now become commonplace to observe that the volatility of the stock market
has increased considerably, particularly in the last few years. However, despite an
ample supply of sophisticated models covering volatility phenomena, there has been
no coherent analysis of structural breaks in the volatility dynamics of German asset
returns and their causes.
Looking at the leading German stock index, the Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX),
and its constituents from 1988 to 2002, we ¯nd a signi¯cant break in volatility. Since
1997 stock market volatility has shown a pronounced upward shift. Coinciding with
the asset price boom and its following upswing, returns on individual shares and on
the index have become far more erratic. In particular, there has been an increase
in the volatility persistence, leading to a more pronounced clustering of extreme
returns.
Furthermore, if we decompose volatility, we ¯nd that idiosyncratic risk, if mea-
sured by the idiosyncratic volatility component, has increased far more than the mar-
ket component of volatility. This is probably connected to the declining correlations
among individual stock returns and has implications for portfolio diversi¯cation.
We relate the increasing volatility and volatility persistence to the growing in-
°uence of institutional investors on the German market. Besides, variations in the
discount factor for asset returns approximated by the volatility of interest rates
would seem to play a role in explaining the volatility shift. Movements of US stock
market returns, although showing marked similarities with German developments,
do not completely explain the structural break in volatility.
¤This paper represents the authors' personal opinions and does not necessarily re°ect the views
of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1Why should we be concerned about volatility? From an orthodox economic point
of view stock market volatility re°ects the information processing mechanism of
investors and some noise coming from liquidity traders. Higher volatility is therefore
connected with a growing volume of news or a greater level of uncertainty about the
future state of the economy. Inconveniences such as hedging against large and more
clustered downswings have to be borne by individual investors.
However, with the growing importance of capital markets in Germany, greater
attention has been paid to relations between volatile stock markets on the one side
and monetary and real side macro variables on the other side. Share price volatility
has an impact on output and in°ation volatility and vice versa (Beltratti and Morana
(2002), Schwert (1989)), can lead to ruptures in the balance sheet transmission
channel of monetary policy and may hamper consumer spending via wealth e®ects
(Mishkin (2001)). Extreme volatile blips can jeopardise the smooth functioning of
¯nancial markets if liquidity dries up or hedging becomes too costly. Consequently,
the economy has become more vulnerable to risks resulting from strains on ¯nancial






The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, we de¯ne di®erent con-
cepts of volatility and explain measurement methods employed in the paper. After
a brief description of the data, we test for structural changes in volatility by means
of CUSUM breakpoint tests. Next, volatility is decomposed into a market and an
idiosyncratic component as an initial attempt to explain the increasing volatility
patterns. The role played by institutional investors, interest rates and the US stock
market in explaining German stock market volatility is investigated in the subse-
quent section. The paper concludes by outlining the importance of our ¯ndings of
increased stock market volatility and suggests future lines of research.
22 Methods
This paper focuses on the volatility structure of the German stock market. The
question of how to measure volatility correctly therefore arises naturally. It is helpful
to di®erentiate between parametric and non-parametric measures of volatility, as
proposed in a recent survey by Anderson, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2002).
Among non-parametric volatility measures, rolling sample and realised volatility
measures have attracted special attention. The two concepts are related but di®er
in the focus of the time horizon. If the price of a stock at time t is denoted as pt,
the daily log returns are:
rt = ln(pt) ¡ ln(pt¡1):
Now we can calculate a backward looking rolling sample volatility estimator for each
day by averaging the squared returns r2









The measure ^ ¾2
t estimates the volatility for each day. By contrast, the idea behind
the realised volatility is to use higher frequency data to compute lower frequency











To analyse the relation between these two measures it is convenient to assume that




2(t) = µ[! ¡ ¾(t)]dt + (2¸µ)
1=2dW¾(t):
(3)
1In this term the index i¤ runs over all n¤ trading days in the month m.
2In this equation Wp(t) and W¾(t) are Wiener processes which are continuous time counterparts
of random walks. Broadly speaking, the terms dWp(t) and dW¾(t) are therefore continuous time
white noise error terms.
3If the price process generated by equation 3 is sampled at discrete and equally spaced
points pt, the discrete process follows an exact GARCH(1,1) model:









with parameters related to the parameters of the GARCH di®usion (equation 3) in a
speci¯cmanner(DrostandWerker(1996)).Inequation3,¾
2(t)istheinstantaneous
volatility. It is the volatility relevant for a small (in theory, in¯nitesimal) interval









is the right concept to use. The instantaneous volatility is related to the conditional
variance while the integrated volatility is related to the unconditional variance. It
has been shown that the rolling sample volatility estimator (equation 1) is a con-
sistent estimator for instantaneous volatility (Andreou and Ghysels (2002b)) while
the realised volatility estimator (equation 2) is a consistent estimator for integrated
volatility (Barndor®-Nielsen and Shepard (2002)). The main advantage of these
non-parametric volatility estimators is that they function independently of a spe-
ci¯c model such as the GARCH di®usion (equation 3). Both measures are valid for
more general stochastic processes.
Parametric volatility measures are an alternative. The most often used para-
metric models are stochastic volatility models and GARCH type models.3 In the
paper we use a GARCH(1,1) model because it is °exible enough to describe the most
important stylised facts of our asset return data. The GARCH(1,1) model actually
used
rt = ¹ + Árt¡1 + ¾tzt
¾
2






3The parametric GARCH models can also be interpreted in a non-parametric manner. This
interpretation considers a GARCH model as a ¯lter for a general stochastic process. See Anderson,
Bollerslev, and Diebold (2002). However, this interpretation is not used in this paper.
4is slightly more general than equation 4 and allows for a drift and serial correlation in
the return process rt. The main advantage of parametric models over non-parametric
volatility measures is that they allow the volatility process to be interpreted in
greater detail. If, for example, a non-parametric volatility measure shows an increase
in the (average) volatility after a certain point in time, this may be attributable
to di®erent changes of the parameters of an underlying parametric model. The




1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
; (7)
andanincreaseinthevolatilitycanbecausedeitherbyanincreasein!or®+¯.4
The interpretations of these two possibilities are rather di®erent. If an increase in ! is
the reason for the higher overall volatility, the volatility clustering is not e®ected. If,
instead, a larger ®+¯ is the reason for the higher volatility, the volatility persistence
also increases. This has di®erent consequences for capital market participants. A
higher volatility persistence implies not only a higher volatility but also a stronger
volatility clustering. High volatility trading days are more likely to be followed
by further high volatility trading days. In addition, a higher volatility persistence
causes an increase in the fatness of the tails of the unconditional distribution of the
returns. A higher volatility persistence implies a higher kurtosis of the unconditional
distribution of a GARCH(1,1) process given by (Franses and van Dijk (2000)):
K =
3(1 ¡ (® + ¯)2)
1 ¡ (® + ¯)2 ¡ 2®2: (8)
3 Data
The DAX comprises the 30 largest and most actively traded listed German com-
panies. The index capitalisation captures nearly 60% of overall stock market capi-
talisation.5Itsorder-bookturnoveraccountsfor87%oftotalorder-bookturnoverof
4® + ¯ < 1: In the following we will call ® + ¯ the volatility persistence.
5Since 24 June 2002 the DAX has been free °oat weighted and makes up around 50% of the
market capitalisation of all domestic equities.
5domestic equities on all German exchanges and for 90% on the electronic trading
platform XETRA.6 We use the DAX price index calculated as a Laspeyres-type in-
dex on the basis of the daily closing prices of the 30 constituents. The index and
¯rm level prices were obtained from the Deutsche BÄ orse AG. In the price series of
the constituents we deal with stock split-ups, mergers, and company exchanges by
using chaining and adjustment factors. Using the compound series of the particular
actual index constituents avoids the issue of survivorship bias.7 Our sample runs
from 31 December 1987, the base date of the DAX, to 31 December 2002.
We calculate daily weights for the index constituents using a centered rolling
OLS regression with a 40-day window and HP-¯ltered them with ¸ = 109. The
recalculated return series from the weighted returns of the 30 constituents shows
a correlation of 0.979 with the original index returns. When analysing the rolling
sample estimator with a window width of 21-days, the recalculated series from the
weighted individual returns behave much as the original DAX return series.8
4 Structural break in volatility
To assess whether there is a change in the structure of the stock market volatility,
a good place to start is with a non-parametric volatility measure. Figure 4 on page
13 shows the rolling sample volatility of the DAX returns for a 21-day window. The
¯gure suggests, that average volatility is higher in the last quarter of the sample.
Formal testing puts these results on a sound statistical basis. In this paper we use a
test on breaks in the dynamics of general ARCH(1) models proposed by Kokoszka
and Leipus (1999, 2000) and discussed extensively by Andreou and Ghysels (2002a).
6Source: Deutsche BÄ orse AG. Figures are for December 2002.
7The coe±cient of variation shows a higher value for compound series although ANOVA indi-
cates no statistically signi¯cant di®erence.
8In addition, the actual weights capturing the ratio of shares of a company to overall shares
on the base date adjusted for share splits, subscription rights and company exchanges are highly
correlated with our estimated weights (0.98 for daily weights and 0.96 for monthly weights). Since
actual daily and monthly weights could not be obtained for the full sample period, correlations
could be calculated only for sub-samples.




















where 0 < k < T, and belongs to the category of CUSUM (cumulated sum of
squares) type tests. Using Rk it is possible to construct a test with the null hy-
potheses of no change against the alternative of a change in the volatility dynamics




where ^ ¾ is an estimator of ¾ =
qP1
j=¡1 Cov(rj;r0), behaves asymptotically like
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-type distribution (Andreou and Ghysels, 2002a). An auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity consistent estimator ^ ¾ is necessary to carry out
this test and we use the Vector Autoregression Heteroscedasticity and Autocorre-
lation Consistent (VARHAC) estimator, as recommended by Andreou and Ghysels
(2002a).
Apart from the question of whether there is a break in the volatility dynamics
at all, it is interesting to estimate the break date. A consistent estimator of the
breakpoint is:
^ k = min
µ





To get an impression about the estimation uncertainty of the break date, we have
implemented con¯dence intervals based on a wild-bootstrap procedure similar to a
method recently proposed by Goncalves and Kilian (2002) in a di®erent context. The
test statistic for the break test (equation 10) calculated for the DAX log returns takes
a value of 1.61 and therefore shows a break which is signi¯cant at the 5% level.9 The
estimated break date is 17 July 1997. Because, owing to estimation uncertainties,
the break date is not known precisely, it is futile to ask what exactly happened on 17
July 1997. For this reason it is necessary to calculate con¯dence intervals, allowing
for an assessment of other possible break dates. In Figure 1, the DAX returns
9The asymptotical critical value at the 5% signi¯cance level is 1.36. See Andreou and Ghysels
(2002a).
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DAX returns
are plotted and the bold vertical line in 1997 shows the estimated breakpoint. The
shaded area is the 95% con¯dence band around the point estimate.10 It is interesting
to note that the con¯dence band is asymmetric. It is therefore unlikely that the
break occurred much before the beginning of 1997, although the break may possibly
have taken place in 1998. This provides important pointers when attempting to
¯nd reasons for the break in volatility. The DAX is a compound series of 30 stocks
and it is therefore interesting to analyse potential volatility breaks in the underlying
stock prices. The vertical lines in Figure 2 on page 9 show the point estimates of the
individual stock prices and the shaded area depicts again the con¯dence band for the
DAX breakpoint. With the exception of one stock11 all individual break dates are
close to the DAX break date. Indeed, most of the breakpoints of the individual series
are within the con¯dence interval for the DAX. This is rather surprising because the
10The lower limit of the con¯dence band is 27 March 1997 and the upper limit is 17 August
1998.
11The estimated breakpoint for one of the series is in 1993 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix) and
is not shown in Figure 2.
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construction of the con¯dence interval for the DAX does not use information about
underlying stock returns and most of these returns enter the DAX only with a
small weight. This excludes the possibility of the break date of the DAX beeing a
statistical artefact.
Once the break in the volatility of the German stock market index DAX has been
identi¯ed, it is extremely relevant to analyse the structure of the volatility process
before and after the break. The easiest way to do this is to estimate a GARCH model
for the pre-break and the post-break period. Table 1 shows the estimated GARCH
parameters. It is immediately apparent that the overall (unconditional) variance
is much higher in the post-break period (3.50 as opposed to 1.29). This variance
corresponds to equation 7. The reason for this is not an increase in the volatility
level ! (equation 6) but an increase in the volatility persistence (® + ¯). This
¯nding is important. Not only is the overall volatility higher after the break; there
is also an increased probability of volatility clustering. This also has implications
for the kurtosis of the unconditional distribution of the stock returns. The kurtosis
(calculated by equation 8) of the DAX returns ranges around 3 before the break and
9Table 1: Pre-break and post-break GARCH estimates for the DAX index
Pre-break period
! ® ¯ Persistence (® + ¯) Variance Kurtosis
0.09 0.12 0.82 0.93 1.29 3.81
Post-break period
! ® ¯ Persistence (® + ¯) Variance Kurtosis
0.07 0.10 0.88 0.98 3.50 6.06
does not rule out the possibility of normally distributed log returns. After the break
the kurtosis is about 6 and indicates an excess kurtosis of the returns. Table A.2
in the Appendix summarises the same calculations for all constituents of the DAX.
The results are comparable to that of the index. For all series with a break in the
variance dynamics, the unconditional variance is higher after the break.12 For most
of the DAX constituents the persistence and the kurtosis is therefore higher after
the break. Interestingly, for some of the series the volatility level ! of the GARCH
volatility equation (! in equation 6) is higher after the break, a phenomenon which
is not seen in the GARCH parameters for the index.
Given that there is a break in the volatility of the DAX stock market index, it
is interesting to view this result from a long-term perspective. The DAX has been
in existence since 1988 only, but we can use a recalculated stock price index which
goes back to 1965.13 For this time horizon we have estimated a Markov switching
12Series No 14 is an exception. For this series an IGARCH process would seem to be appropriate
before and after the break, and the unconditional variance and kurtosis are therefore in¯nite in
both periods.
13This series comprises the Hardy-Index, which is chained in 1981 to the BÄ orsenzeitungsindex,
which is chained to the DAX in 1988. The historical indices contain the equally weighted share
prices of the largest German stocks. Since share price returns seem to be scale-dependent, the
historical data may well present a distorted picture of the volatility of the stock market. In
addition, it is only since 1988 that the German stock market index has been extensively used as a
benchmark for investors, leading to di®erent trading patterns for single stocks.
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model for the log returns. In the model, two regimes are allowed and the intercept
and the variance of the stock returns can switch between two values.14 On the basis
of this model, regime probabilities can be calculated for each day; the probabilities
for a high volatility regime are shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix. If we ¯nd
that the stock market follows the high volatility regime for a few days only, we have
no grounds to speak of a break in the volatility regime. To detect volatility regimes
we therefore use a heuristic classi¯cation procedure. If the stock market volatility
switches to another regime and the new regime lasts for a certain period of time, say
one quarter, we detect a change in the volatility regime. It can switch back to the
former regime if it also stays there for at least one quarter. Using this classi¯cation
procedure, ¯ve high-volatility regimes can be identi¯ed; they are shown in Figure 3
as shaded areas. The ¯rst high volatility regime lasts from October 1973 to January
1974, the second from April 1986 to August 1986, the third from October 1987 to
14The estimations are performed using the Ox package MSVAR written by Hans Martin Krolzig
(http://www.econ.ox.ac.uk/research/hendry/krolzig/) and the Ox programming language by Jur-
gen Doornik (http://www.nu®.ox.ac.uk/users/doornik/).
11May 1988, the fourth from August 1990 to March 1991, and the ¯fth from July 1997
up to at least the end of 2002. The starting point of the last high volatility regime
coincides perfectly with our estimated break date. This is surprising because the
volatility break test and the Markov switching model are very di®erent methods.
However, the coincidence of the starting point of the most recent high volatility
period demonstrates the robustness of the results. Interestingly, all high volatility
periods apart from the one starting in July 1997 last less than half a year. Indeed,
if we use a six-month criterium for the regime classi¯cation instead of one quarter,
only the last period is found to be a high volatility regime. The 1997 break in the
DAX seems to be an isolated occurrence, even when the German stock market is
viewed from a broader historical perspective.
5 Volatility decomposition
Further investigations into changes in stock market volatility set out to detect un-
derlying causes of the estimated structural break.
Looking ¯rst at the rolling 21-day window of squared returns, we calculate this






idiosyncratic component. The idiosyncratic volatility part|the di®erence between
aggregate volatility and market volatility|copies the result of the CUSUM break-
point test. The idiosyncratic volatility level has increased ¯vefold since 1997 whereas
market volatility has risen only by the factor of 2.7. A more complex method of
volatility decomposition is described in the following paragraphs.
15Unless otherwise stated, the market return denotes the return of the recalculated DAX index
comprising the weighted sum of its constituents returns.
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Idiosyncratic volatility
13The idiosyncratic volatility of any one stock is unobservable. On the basis of the
CAPM, the idiosyncratic or unsystematic return as well as the volatility of an indi-
vidual company is measured relative to the systematic return or volatility of a ¯rm.
We follow Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) in the decomposition, although
we merely derive a company-speci¯c and not an industry-speci¯c component.
Let us denote the simple excess return of a ¯rm i = (1;:::;30) in period t as Ri;t.
This can be decomposed into an idiosyncratic component RI
i;t and the systematic
excess return ¯iRM






































variances across companies is taken:
30 X
i=1








Inserting equation 13 gives:
30 X
i=1









16The safe interest rate is the three-month Euribor, which replaced the three-month FIBOR,
which replaced the short-term interest rate o®ered on the Frankfurt banking place.
14Using daily returns, d, we construct volatility estimators at monthly intervals, t.
To estimate the variance components (equation 16), we use the squared time series
variation of the individual return component within each month.17
Denoting the estimators for market volatility as
P
d2t(RM
d )2 = ^ vM





d2t(Ri;d)2 = ^ vA
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allow the volatility of the market portfolio to remain fairly stable or to show no more
than a small increase even if there is a pronounced increase in the volatility of each
individual stock. The sub-sample before 1997 shows an equally weighted average of
pairwisecorrelationsacrossthe30constituentsof0.49,whereasthesub-samplefrom
1997 onwards exhibits only an average of 0.34.19
The implications are twofold. On the one hand, with higher idiosyncratic volatil-
ity, portfolio diversi¯cation becomes more bene¯cial since unsystematic risk can be
eliminated if a mixture of di®erent stocks are held. On the other hand, if, on account
of wealth constraints, it is not possible to hold a well-diversi¯ed portfolio, increasing
idiosyncratic volatility can overcompensate for the e®ects of declining correlations
17By using this measure of volatility instead of variances, we avoid the additional noise that
comes from estimating the mean of the time series each month.
18A similar representation is used by Xu and Malkiel (2003).
19The correlation dynamics is documented by calculating the equally weighted average of all
pairwise correlations for each month using the last 12-months daily observations. Nevertheless,
correlation ¯gures increase towards the end of the sample.




























1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Aggregate volatility
16among individual stocks and can put the portfolio at greater risk. Accordingly, in
recent years private households in Germany have shown greater interest in already
diversi¯ed investments in mutual funds than for direct investments in shares. The
number of fund owners nearly quadrupled between 1997 and 2002 whereas the num-
ber of direct shareholders has not quite doubled (Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2002)).
6 What causes the shift in volatility?
For some years attempts have been made to determine what causes stock return
volatility to be time varying. A recent overview of studies which focus mainly
on the US market is given by Beltratti and Morana (2002), Schwert (2002), and
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001). Explanatory factors cover the volatility
of macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables (O±cer (1973), Schwert (1989)), the e®ect
of news (Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), Funke and Matsuda (2002)) and ¯rm-
speci¯c causes (Schwert (2002), Dennis and Strickland (2002)).
We restrict ourselves to endeavouring to explain the shift in volatility in Germany.
As this shift appears in nearly every return series of the DAX and its constituents




then try to link uncertainty about the future net value of the DAX to the volatility
of a discount factor as proxied by di®erent interest rates.
First, it is important to test whether the volatility of the German stock market
is driven by international factors only. We regressed the log returns of the DAX
against the contemporaneous and lagged log returns of the S&P 100 and the Dow
Jones Composite 65. The estimation results are shown in Tables A.4 and A.5 in
20A principal component analysis of the volatility series of the constituents of the DAX shows no
signi¯cantly di®erent behaviour of shares of di®erent industries, eg ¯nancial shares or tech stocks.
A common underlying factor is identi¯ed as driving large parts of the volatility development.
17the Appendix. In both cases the R2 is over 20%, which is quite a high ¯gure
for a regression analysis of daily log returns. A considerable proportion of the daily
movements of the DAX can therefore be explained by the US stock market. However,
an analysis of the residuals of the regressions of the DAX on the US stocks shows
a signi¯cant break in the volatility at exactly the same break date as that on the
DAX. The S&P 100 and the Dow Jones Composite 65 therefore fail to provide an
explanation for the shift in volatility. Consequently, the increase in volatility of the
DAX after 1997 cannot be explained by international in°uences alone.
Our aggregate institutional ownership indicator comprises the holdings of insti-
tutional investors at domestic credit institutions in relation to the total value of
domestic shares in circulation, both at nominal values. Institutional investors are
investment companies, insurance companies, other corporate enterprises and non-
residents; most non-residents are clearing institutions and foreign banks. Data is
collected from the Bundesbank's capital market statistics and the annual securities
deposits statistics.21 We interpolated the time series linearly to obtain data points
on a daily basis. In Figure 7 the DAX returns and the institutional investor indicator
(dashedline)areshown.Theboldverticallineisagainthevolatilitybreakdateand the
shadedareathecon¯denceintervalforthebreakpoint.The figure suggests thatthe
sharp increase of the institutional investors ratio coincides with the volatility break
date. However, a more formal procedure is needed to test the relationship between
the DAX volatility and the institutional investors. If our institutional investor vari-
able was included as additional regressor (besides the lagged squared returns and
the lagged variance) in the variance equation of our GARCH (1,1) model on the
DAX returns, we found institutional ownership to be signi¯cant at the 95% level
(see Table A.3 in the Appendix). To avoid running a spurious regression since both
time series are upward sloping, we included an additional trend in the variance equa-
tion. However, the trend is not signi¯cant and hence does not explain the shift in
21Security deposits comprise around three-quarters of overall domestic shares. The remaining
quarter consists mainly of cross equity holdings among companies. Data from the security deposits
statistics is used up to 2001.
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variances.
Why should the number of institutional investors explain increasing volatility of
stock returns and even a growing persistence of volatility? Institutional investors
manage large amounts of assets, they have instruments at hand with which to react
to every item of news, and transaction costs do not hinder adjustment reactions.
This leads to an immediate adjustment to a new e±cient share price equilibrium.
Nonetheless, herding can trigger the clustering of price movements (Froot, Scharf-
stein, and Stein (1992)). The evaluation of fund managers based on relative instead
of absolute performance, momentum trading strategies and the existence of positive
feedback trading|a rational agent will purchase more stocks than justi¯ed by his
private information because he knows there are positive feedback traders|can in-
duce a clustering of trading activities and abnormal returns.22 There has been weak
evidence from studies using the amount of institutional ownership of companies
(Dennis and Strickland (2002), Xu and Malkiel (2003)) or data on investors port-
22A recent survey about the behaviour of investment fund managers in Germany by Arnswald
(2001) gives some evidence for herding behaviour among fund managers.
19folios and transactions (Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes (2001), Borensztein and
Gelos (2003)) to show that herding and volatility go together and that volatility
induced by institutional investors is not limited to single days. Yet, no clear-cut ex-
planation has been given as to why the time horizon for volatility clustering extends
over several months.
When qualifying the interpretation of institutional investors as driving force
for volatility, one should note, that the institutional investor variable might be
endogenous itself. In the previous discussion we have implicitly assumed that our
institutional investor variable is given exogenously. This need not necessarily be the
case. The increase in the market volatility could also have caused an increase in the
numberofinstitutionalinvestorstradingonthemarket,becausetheysupplytheir
customers with additional hedging possibilities. We cannot rule out such a possibility
in any case. However, institutional investors became increasingly more important
at least two years before 1997, ie the lower bound of our con¯dence interval of the
breakpoint(seeFigure7).Thegrowingnumberofinstitutionalinvestorsistherefore
probably a cause for the break in volatility in the sense of Granger-causality.
In present value models, changes in the volatility of either future dividend pay-
outs or discount rates cause changes in the volatility of stock returns. Dividend
changes are not su±cient to explain share price movements (Shiller (2000), Delong
and Becht (1992)); we therefore look at a discount factor as proxied by interest rates
as explanatory factor. Since daily changes in government bond yields and short-term
interest rates are available, it is advisable to employ the same technique to test for
volatility shifts as for the index return series. The CUSUM-type estimator gives the
time at which there is maximal sample evidence for a break in variances. In Table 2
the volatility break tests for interest rates on di®erent maturities are collected. No
break can be detected for the 3-month money market rate.23 The breakpoints for
the volatility of one-year and ten-year government bond redemption yields24 are in
1995 and 1994 respectively and the volatility is higher after the break for both series.
23The short-term interest rate series is the same as for the safe interest rate. See section 5.
24Data is taken from the Bundesbank's capital markets statistics.
20Table 2: Test for a break in the volatility of interest rates
Maturity Test value Lower bound Break date Upper bound
3 months 1.191 No break
1 year 2.143 17/01/1994 29/03/1995 09/02/1999
10 years 1.698 12/01/1994 03/02/1994 21/08/1998
These breakpoints seem to be too early to be related to the break in the volatility of
the DAX in 1997. However, if the wide con¯dence intervals are taken into account,
the breaks in the volatility of the interest rates may help to explain the break in the
stock market volatility. It should be noted however, that the whole argumentation
is based on a partial equilibrium analysis. The interest rates and their volatility are
considered as exogenous. In a general equilibrium approach both, the stock market
prices and the interest rates should be explained simultaneously.
7 Outlook
We found ¯rm evidence of a structural break in volatility on the German stock
market in 1997. One possible explanation for the increase in volatility is the growing
in°uence of institutional investors.
Whereas the increase in overall volatility can be seen using non-parametric mea-
sures, parametric measures help to relate the volatility shift to an increased persis-
tence of volatility and accordingly to fatter tails of the return distribution. Decom-
posing the realised volatility we see that market volatility increased to a far lesser
extent than idiosyncratic or ¯rm-speci¯c volatility. These results put the spotlight
on portfolio diversi¯cation as a mean of eliminating unsystematic risk but they
also highlight the considerable increase in risk incurred by narrow investments in
portfolios which are not well diversi¯ed. Companies with large (cross) holdings, in
particular, may therefore be more exposed to default risks. Nevertheless, market
participants are becoming increasingly aware of the risk stemming from increased
21volatility and demonstrate greater willingness to deal with volatility risks, as the
recent development of a market for volatility derivatives has shown.25
Will the state of high volatility persist? From a historical perspective high
volatility periods in the US have typically been followed by lower volatility periods
as shown by the decrease after the 1920s or, more recently, the volatility downswing
after the stock market crash in 1987 (Delong and Becht (1992)). In the long run
volatility is not trending but rather exhibits breaks or di®erent regimes. Our Markov
switching analysis of German stock market volatility since 1965 shows that the
current high volatility period is exceptionally long. The 1997 break in volatility
may therefore be a permanent one.
Since at a ¯rst glance we ¯nd no evidence of a di®erent volatility behaviour
in di®erent industries and branches within the DAX, it might be interesting to
look at spillover e®ects between di®erent markets, eg the NEMAX and the DAX.
This would help to clarify the underlying causes of volatility shifts. Of course,
there is a range of possible factors a®ecting volatility which could provide fruitful
areas for future research. Another important research agenda is general equilibrium
modelling. Up to now the focus in general equilibrium models is on ¯rst moments
and is by construction not able to explain second moments such as variance or
volatility. Yet, some very recent developments in higher-order approximation of
computable general equilibrium models open the possibility to investigate the origins
of volatility and volatility clustering in a general equilibrium context.
25The not (yet) institutionalised market consists mainly of bank dealers.
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25A Appendix
Table A.1: Estimated breakpoints
time series label test value lower limit break date upper limit
1 ALV 1.61 28.01.1997 3.07.1997 19.08.1998
2 BAS 2.54 27.06.1996 27.11.1996 15.10.1997
3 BAY 2.20 5.11.1996 2.12.1996 23.10.1997
4 BMW 2.75 29.11.1996 13.03.1997 24.10.1997
5 HVM 1.94 9.07.1997 10.07.1997 20.05.1998
6 BHW-ADS 3.06 4.12.1996 18.07.1997 17.10.1997
7 CBK 1.65 6.03.1997 7.07.1997 30.09.1997
8 CONT-MUV 1.72 2.04.1997 3.07.1997 3.02.1998
9 DCX 1.86 27.02.1997 22.10.1997 26.05.1998
10 DGS-ALT 2.54 22.11.1996 14.05.1997 17.10.1997
11 DBC-SAP 2.96 17.10.1996 29.07.1998 25.08.1998
12 DBK 2.19 24.03.1997 21.07.1997 5.08.1998
13 DRB-MLP 1.63 7.07.1997 13.07.1998 1.05.2002
14 FDN-MET-DTE 2.20 4.11.1993 3.12.1993 3.09.1998
15 HEN 2.07 12.04.1996 5.12.1996 27.08.1997
16 HOE-FME 2.36 29.11.1996 3.03.1997 23.10.1997
17 KAR-DPW 2.30 15.11.1996 15.05.1997 25.06.1998
18 KFH-MEO 2.23 26.02.1997 4.07.1997 22.10.1997
19 LIN 2.37 3.01.1997 3.01.1997 21.07.1997
26continued from previous page
Time series Label Test value Lower limit Break date Upper limit
20 LHA 1.30 No break No break No break
21 MAN 1.69 12.08.1991 22.10.1997 23.07.1998
22 MMN-EPC-DB1 1.60 20.10.1997 26.02.1998 26.08.1998
23 NIX-PRS-TUI 1.82 16.01.1990 17.04.1998 19.08.1998
24 RWE 2.50 8.10.1996 22.07.1997 9.09.1997
25 SCH 2.14 15.11.1996 15.07.1997 23.10.1997
26 SIE 2.06 23.06.1997 18.07.1997 17.07.1998
27 THY 2.33 28.01.1997 7.08.1998 4.09.1998
28 VEB-EON 2.20 21.02.1997 30.07.1997 15.06.1998
29 VIA-IFX 1.47 1.05.1998 28.05.1998 29.06.2000




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table A.3: GARCH model with investor variable
Dependent Variable: DAX (log returns) Method: ML - ARCH (BHHH)
Sample(adjusted): 4/01/1988 31/12/2001 Included observations: 3651
after adjusting endpoints Convergence achieved after 52 iterations
Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C 0.057291 0.018710 3.062151 0.0022
DAX(-1) 0.037008 0.020263 1.826436 0.0678
Variance Equation
C -0.355811 0.133311 -2.669027 0.0076
ARCH(1) 0.109048 0.033070 3.297489 0.0010
GARCH(1) 0.829841 0.038344 21.64185 0.0000
INVESTOR 0.014221 0.005673 2.506882 0.0122
TREND -4.63E-05 3.02E-05 -1.533982 0.1250
Table A.4: DAX returns explained by S&P 100
Dependent Variable: DAX (log returns) Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 7/01/1988 31/12/2002 Included observations: 3909
after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -9.37E-05 0.000199 -0.471154 0.6376
SP100 0.487479 0.018369 26.53758 0.0000
SP100(-1) 0.384014 0.018356 20.92004 0.0000
SP100(-2) -0.036437 0.018355 -1.985178 0.0472
SP100(-3) 0.037065 0.018342 2.020793 0.0434
R-squared 0.224122 Mean dependent var 0.000190
Adjusted R-squared 0.223327 S.D. dependent var 0.014088
S.E. of regression 0.012415 Akaike info criterion -5.938496
Sum squared resid 0.601761 Schwarz criterion -5.930475
Log likelihood 11611.79 F-statistic 281.9304
Durbin-Watson stat 2.297557 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
30Table A.5: DAX returns explained by Dow Jones Comp 65
Dependent Variable: DAX (log returns) Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 7/01/1988 31/12/2002 Included observations: 3909
after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -7.40E-05 0.000200 -0.369859 0.7115
DOW 0.555288 0.021219 26.16991 0.0000
DOW(-1) 0.381840 0.021236 17.98085 0.0000
DOW(-2) -0.090035 0.021235 -4.239915 0.0000
DOW(-3) 0.045386 0.021185 2.142342 0.0322
R-squared 0.214598 Mean dependent var 0.000190
Adjusted R-squared 0.213794 S.D. dependent var 0.014088
S.E. of regression 0.012491 Akaike info criterion -5.926296
Sum squared resid 0.609148 Schwarz criterion -5.918274
Log likelihood 11587.94 F-statistic 266.6763
Durbin-Watson stat 2.259029 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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